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                 Abstract 
 
 
BMW is one of the leading players in the premium segment of the global a tomotive 
market. The company has established a distinctive brand identity th ough engineering 
and design excellence and has been the industry benchmark for product evelopment 
and brand building. Under the product offensive strategy, BMW aims to be present in 
the premium end of all significant market segments and is launching n w produc  i  
rapid succession. This paper examines BMW’s innovation and growth strategies in 
order to identify and learn best practices in product development, brand managemen , 
and human resource management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
BMW(Bayerische Motoren Werke AG) is one of the leading players in the 
premium segment of the global automotive market. Based in Munich, G rmany, the 
BMW Group has been focusing on selected premium segments with the brands BMW, 
MINI, and Rolls-Royce Motor Cars. BMW cars have been highly appreciated by the 
motoring press and driving enthusiasts for its engineering and design excellence. Th  
vehicles have long been the essence of sporty driving, combining though ful 
engineering, originality, craftsmanship, speed, and handling. Buyer  often viewed BMW 
cars as special, unique, and worth more money than cars built for th asses. 
 
According to BMW management, 2004 has been the most successful year to date 
in terms of sales and financial performance (See Exhibit 1). Despite adverse global 
economic conditions, the BMW Group delivered a total of 1,208,732 vehicles in 2004, 
an increase of 9.4% compared to the previous year. Net profit grew by 14.1% to  
2,222 million euro, and return on sales reached 8.0%, one of the highest figure among 
the world’s automotive companies.  
 
Exhibit 1: BMW Group—Key Figures 
 
                               2003           2004          Change(%) 
Vehicle production   
  BMW                       944,072       1,059,978         12.3 
  MINI                        174,366        189,492           8.7 
  Rolls-Royce                     502            875          74.3
  Motorcycles                  89,745         93,836            4.6 
In euro million                  2003           2004           Change(%) 
Revenues                      41,525         44,335            6.8 
Capital expenditure              4,245          4,347           2.4 
Cash flow                       4,490          5,167            15.  
Operating profit                 3,205          3,554           10.9 
Net profit                       1,947          2,222           14.1     
Source: BMW Annual Report 2004 
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Dr. Helmut Panke, Chairman of BMW, says “BMW builds high-performing 
products because BMW is a high-performance organization”. In the Fortune 2005 
World’s Most Admired Companies list, BMW was ranked 11thamong the All-Star list 
and 2rd among non-U.S. companies after Toyota (See Exhibit 2). Even though Toyota 
and Honda may be better in terms of operational excellence, quality and productivity, 
BMW has been the most admired company for product development, design and 
marketing. 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Fortune 2005 The World’s Most Admired Companies 
Rank          Company             Industry               Country  
1       General Electric          Electronics               U.S. 
2       Wal-Mart Stores      General merchandising       U.S. 
3        Dell                    Computers                U.S 
4       Microsoft                Computers                U.S. 
5       Toyota Motor          Motor vehicles              Japan 
6       Procter&Gamble      Household products          U.S 
7      Johnson&Johnson      Pharmaceuticals              U.S 
8        FedEx                  Delivery                  U.S 
9         IBM                   Computers                 U.S 
10     Berkshire Hathaway      Insurance                  U.S 
11        BMW                Motor vehicles              Germany
12       Intel                  Semiconductors              U.S 
13       UPS                     Delivery                  U.S 
14      Home Depot          Specialty retailers             U.S 
15       Sony                   Electronics                Japan 
Source: Fortune, March 7, 2005 
 
 
 
This paper examines BMW’s innovation and growth strategies in order to 
identify and learn best practices in product development, brand management and 
human resource management.  
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2. Company Background 
 
BMW was established in 1916 by Gustav Otto a  a manufacturer of aircraft
engine. In 1917, BMW registered its trademark blue and white rotating propeller st ll
used today. After World War I, the company shifted to making motorc cles an  
passenger cars. The first BMW motorcycle, the R32, introduced in 1923 was hailed as 
the most elegantly designed engine of the day. BMW won more than 100 motorcycle 
races and boasted 573 first-place finishes by 1928. 
 
BMW launched its first car model ‘Dixi’ in 1928, which was followed by the 
BMW 3/20 and its derivatives. The 326 saloon, the first BMW to challenge Mercedes-
Benz in the saloon segment, debut d i  1936. BMW introduced its first sports car 
model, the 238, which became a major success in international motor racing events. 
This was the car, more than other, that defined the prewar BMW and est blished the 
company’s reputation for engineering and design excellence. 
 
Car production stopped in 1939, as Hitler needed a first-class airplane engine 
manufacturer. Under the Nazis, BMW built a rcraft engines, rockets and develop d the 
world’s first production jet engine. As World War II drew to a close, its plant in Munich 
had been destroyed by Allied bombing and the company was in dire straits. With its 
factories dismantled, BMW survived by making kitchen and garden equipment.  
 
BMW jumped back into the car business in 1951 with the launch of the 01 
model. However, sales of the big pricey saloon languished despite Germany’s 
economic recovery. Turning a bit desperate, BMW introduced the Isetta, a tiny three-
wheel microcar in 1955, which turned out to be a failure as well. In 1959, the 
company’s weak financial position almost led to a takeover by its traditional riv l, 
Mercedes-Benz. BMW was rescued by Herb rt Quandt, who acquired control of the 
company for $1 million and initiated a restructuring to bring the company ba k on track. 
 
In 1959, the success of the BMW 700(a small car) helped the company regain 
its position in the market. In 1966, with its larger, more sophisticated 02 series, BMW 
created a new automobile market segment that combined the high-performan e 
engineering of sporty roadsters wi h the size, styling, and comfort of the European 
luxury sedan. This combination set BMW apart from its competitors nd enabled it t  
create its own special place in the premium automobile segment.  
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From 1970 to 1990, sales grew by a factor of 15 and the company expanded 
operations in Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific. It had positioned itsel  as a 
trendy and reliable brand, more stylish than other German car brands such as 
Volkswagen and Mercedes. In addition to styling, heavy investments in R&D put the 
company at the leading edge of technology in such critical areas as en ines, pollution 
control, safety, chassis design, suspension systems, automotive electronics, and 
transmissions. Automotive critics regularly voted BMW’s models the best cars in the 
world in their respective class. In 1992, BMW succeeded in outselling Mercedes in 
Europe for the first time. 
 
Despite its impressive growth over the past few decades, BMW in the mid-
1990s had a world market share of only 1.5%. BMW viewed itself as a a highly focused 
“manufacturer of unique automobiles for a clearly defined, exclusiv  a d demanding 
clientele all over the world.” However, in response to the global consolidation of the 
automotive industry, BMW felt the need to expand its product range and achieve 
economies of scale in R&D, purchasing roduction and distribution to survive in this 
business. This led to the decision to acquire Rover, the British au omob le group, in 
1994. 
 
Unfortunately, BMW failed to reap the expected synergies from th Rover 
acquisition. Rover cars had many quality problems and all its products, except the Land 
Rover, performed poorly in the market. By 2000, BMW had spent over $4.4 billion on 
Rover since its acquisition in 1994, but did not find any chances of turni g it arou d in 
the near future. In May 2000, BMW sold Rover to Phoenix Consortium and retained the 
rights to the MINI brand and the production site at Cowley.  
 
As part of the restructuring plan, BMW refocused its resources in 
strengthening its position in the premium car segment. Its objective was to e tablish 
itself in every sub-segment of the premium market, from entry level to the top. Under 
the leadership of Helmut Panke,BMW implemented a product offensive strategy, 
launching new products in rapid succession at each level of the pr mium au omobi  
segment (See Exhibit 3) 
 
 
 
 5
        Exhibit 3: BMW product launches(2002-2008E) 
 
 
7 Series Saloon
Z4 Roadster
Rolls Royce Phantom
5 Series Saloon
6 Series Coupé
X3 SUV
MNI Cabrio
6 Series Cabrio
5 Series Touring
1 Series Hatch
3 Series Saloon
X5 SUV
3 Series Touring
4 Series Cabrio
4 Series Coupé
2 Series Coupé
2 Series Cabrio
MINI hatch
5 Series MPV
1 Series Touring
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20072008
Source : Global Insight, USB estimates
 
 
 
As part of the implementation of the market of ensive strategy, BMW further 
expanded its production and sales network worldwide. It currently has 23 production 
and assembly plants in seven countries, and is now represented in 34 cou tries via its 
own sales companies. At present, the dealer organization for the BMW brand 
comprises more than 3,000 locations around the world. Exhibit 4 shows the BMW 
group revenues by region 
 
 6
   Exhibit 4: BMW Group Revenues by Region(2004) 
 
Region                         euro million 
Germany                        11,961 
Rest of Europe                   10,574 
North America                   10,205   
United Kingdom                   5,249 
Asia/Oceania                      4,915 
Other markets                     1,431     
Source: BMW Annual Report 2004 
 
 
 
 
3. Product Development and Innovation Process 
 
New product development at BMW is a complex, time-consuming, and 
expensive undertaking involving the cooperation of thousands of specialis s in vari  
areas and disciplines. Three questions a  of fundamental significance at BMW: 
 
1. What does the customer want? 
2. How quickly is a vehicle developed? 
3. How quickly will it be built and delivered to the customer? 
 
Six years before the scheduled introduction, BMW designers begin exploring 
various alternatives for the car’s exterior appearance and interior layout. It is a 
creative process that not only tries to get the technical elements like aerodynamics, 
ergonomics, and safety right, but also tries to create an aesthetically excellent and 
durable design that will still look fresh and be sellable in 12 y ars. According to Chris 
Bangle, BMW’s chief of design, “We don’t make automobiles, which are utilitarian 
machines you use to get from point A to point B. We make cars, moving works of rt 
that express the driver’s love of quality. 
  
BMW viewed design as the link betwe n ts past and future. Thus,BMW 
designers sought to retain a familiar resemblance between all its models. Consistent 
design features included the dual circular headlights and the “double kidney” grille in 
 7
the front of the car. At the same time, internal competition is encourag d in order o 
create a dynamic exchange of viewpoints. Bangle would typically have five or six 
teams initially competing for the right to design a new model. Once a design is 
designated the front-runner at the start of a new model, another eam is lways 
assigned the task of creating a counterpoint design. 
 
After evaluating numerous drawings and models, BMW management would give 
final approval to the overall product concept and style. Product engineers then 
translated the product concept into a vehicle with the specified functiona  and aesthetic 
characteristics. This required designing and specifying the shape, dimensions, and 
materials of thousands of individual compo ents, and the details of production 
process, such as the type of tools that would be used to shape various p rts. At BMW, 
new products typically passed through three to five design cycles.  
 
Over the past ten years, BMW has managed to reduce the pre-production 
development phase for a series model from appr ximately 60 to 30 months. In the 
mid-90s, senior management assembl d a reengineering task force to ex mine how to 
slash product development time by 50%. The task force identified five key process
areas---body, climate control, fuel supply, test engines, and acoustics---that 
accounted for about 90% of the critical processes in the product developm nt process.
To achieve the bold target, three ch n s would have to take place: 1) increased 
parallelization of design tasks  2) elimination of some design iterations such as 
physical prototyping  3) quicker completion of the remaining design iterations. 
 
     To reduce the time and cost of development, computer-based systems have 
become an indispensable tool at BMW. Today all production cars at BMW are fi st 
presented, tested and optimized in virtual reality before being shaped “in the metal”. 
All parts and components of a car are first rendered digitally and can be assembled 
virtually within seconds before the first prototype sets out on test track. In vehicle 
projects, all major product, processes and project data, regularly upd ted t  the latest 
status, is available at all times to each BMW employees over theIntranet. This 
significantly facilitates and expedites the simultaneous interaction of designers, 
engineers, purchasers and suppliers working on one project.  
 
    The technical “brain” of the BMW Group is the Research & Innovation Center 
referred to for short as the “FIZ”. Located in the north of Munich, the FIZ Center 
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promotes the cooperation of more than 8,500 specialists including engineers, designers, 
model builders, computer specialists, scientists, production specialists as well as 
purchasing managers and employees from suppliers. The centralization of ca  
development at BMW through placing everyone  the FIZ building has smoothened the 
process of communication across different functions and teams---and has led t  
similar initiatives at other car manufac urers. According to Professor Burkhard 
Goschel, senior executive for Development and Purchasing, “Successful innovations 
are increasingly network-based, th result of systematically integrated teamwork in 
networks that extend beyond the boundaries of one single company. Individual 
knowledge needs to be linked together in order to generate system knowledge.” 
 
In 2004, the BMW Group’s R&D expenditure was more than 2.3 billion euro, 
which represent 5.3% of revenues. All activities throughout research and advanced 
development are oriented towards so-called strategic innovation are s---sectors in 
which the company seeks to achieve leadership in technology. Electrics and 
electronics are now the main driving force behind about 90% of all BMW Group 
innovation. BMW pioneered the use of microcomputers that constantly adjust igni ion
timing and fuel injection to make the most efficient use of fuel. I i  estimated that as 
much as 40% of the cost of producing a BMW relates to electronics, of which 15% is 
software cost. As such, getting the electronics platform up-to-date and stable is 
critical from a cost and product perspective, as well as innovation and differentiation. 
BMW is set to benefit from being a leading member of AUTOSAR, a consortium the 
principal global OEMs, which will standardize electronic architectures and protoc ls 
across the industry. 
 
Given the importance of innovation for competitive advantage and growth, BMW 
developed a well-defined innovation management system divided into three stages: 
 
1. Innovation Research: this stage involves identification of emergng trends and 
technologies across the world. Members of the BMW global network, which 
includes suppliers, universities and resea ch n titutions, send regular reports 
to the company on the latest technology trends and innovation. The repo ts are 
stored in the company’s entral Intranet database and are made available to all 
BMW associates. The content of those reports is by no means limited o 
vehicle engineering, and includes innovat ve i as from other areas f industry, 
such as electronics, aerospace or software engineering. 
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2. Innovation Management: in the second stage, the “innovation councils”, made 
up of representatives of major departments, evaluate the input from  
innovation research stage and asse s their suitability for use in vehicle 
engineering. This cross-functionality enables all major BMW divis ons to share 
information, which was lacking in BMW’s earlier innovation. BMW developed a 
prioritization process under which the innovation projects were rank d u der 
four categories that included Potential, Must, Top, and Breakthrough
Innovations. All innovation projects were consolidated into a single project 
program after prioritizing and were reviewed annually. 
 
3. Innovation Transfer: this stage was primarily aimed at transferring the                
innovation project in the pre-development stage to its respective vehicle 
project managers, who carried on t e actual development work. At this stage, 
the project value was assessed on the basis of cost, time and quality. On the 
basis of risks and market assessment, risky projects were aborted at this stage. 
The innovation transfer stage culminated with the transfer of inovation 
projects to the actual development stage.  
 
BMW attributes its ability to launch new products and models continu us y t  its 
innovation management system, which considerably reduced the time between idea 
generation and final product development. In 2004, BMW received the Best Innovato  
Award, designating it as the most innova ive company in Germany. 
 
 
4. Marketing and Brand Management 
 
 
BMW has created a powerful brand that that is distinctive, authentic and 
consistent. Sporty, performance-oriented cars of a high level of craftsmanship and 
ingenuity has defined BMW throughout its history. The company hastood 
unwaveringly on the same brand platform since 1962 when it introduced the 1500 
saloon as the start of its “New Class” under the new owner Herbert Quandt. According 
to Chairman Helmut Panke, “The BMW brand stands for a promise of fascinating 
individual automobiles. A part of this promise is never build a boring car.” BMW is 
relentless in driving home a focused brand message and strategy that everyone in the 
company, top to bottom, understands. 
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     The man most responsible for establishing the BMW brand in the 1960s was Paul 
Hahnemann. Hahnemann believed products should be born of marketing ide s and 
everything BMW would do must be r oted in a marketing strategy. He emphasized a
niche strategy in both marketing and product development. He saw that Mercedes-
Benz was associated with an image of old Germany and that BMW could counter that 
stodgy image by striving to be a car of the new Germany. He aimed o fill a 
psychological gap in the market, not just  product gap. Hahnemann summed up the 
strategy as “unpretentious exclusivity” and promoted the ad slogan “The New Cl ss”, 
which was well-received by car enthusiasts and put the BMW brandon the map.  
 
     Ammirati & Puris, which became BMW’s first American advertising agency in 
1975, created the perennial slogan “The U timate Driving Machine”. Early 
advertisements highlighted BMW’s performance attributes and pictured BMW models 
in motion rather than stationary to emphasize the brand’s performance. By 1980, BMW 
was a legitimate worldwide brand that stood for performance and sp ty driving. The 
European version of the ad strategy was “Sheer D iving Pleasure” , that is BMW was 
about fast, responsive cars for people who relish the sheer pleasure of driving. 
 
     In mid-2001, two-thirds of BMW customers were male; the aveage BMW 
customer was about 46 years old; median income was $150,000; the majority were 
well-educated, married and had no children. BMW appeals to people who work hard, 
play hard, and achieve a lot very early in life. They tend to beve y active and ngage  
in sports as part of their daily regime. According to Panke, “if you want to have the 
drivers-oriented car, the more active on , you go for the BMW. If you want to be 
driven, you go for the competitor(Mercedes). But this is good because pe pl  have a 
choice.” 
 
     BMW calls its model ranges Series, as in 7 Series, 5 Series, and 3 Series. The 5 
Series was the first high-volume BMW car and clarified BMW’s numeric naming 
system. “Five” was the series, while the next two numbers reflected the engine size. 
Letters would be added to represent certain technology. For example, the 535iX w uld 
mean the car was equipped with a 3.5-liter engine, all-wheel drive(X), and fuel 
injection. BMW’s alphanumeric system made it so such names are associated with 
premium brands and all those engine configurations gave the customer a sense that his 
or her car was practically one of a kind. 
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     BMW established a pattern of expanding a product series through a wide range of 
engine derivatives and body style. Offering numerous engine derivatives was a s nd 
way to further differentiate BMW from its competitors and establish its creden ials as a 
serious engineering-driven brand. By constant and annual upgrade and freshening of 
the model series, it could keep sales relatively strong and stab, and kept the motor 
press interested in the series over the course of a seven-year run.  
 
     According to UBS research, the average BMW leaves the factory with optional 
extras worth 20% of the list price of the vehicle. Consumer spendi g on options has 
been increasing by an average of 7% per annum ver the last five years. While base 
specifications are constantly improving, new options are constantly becoming available. 
Exhibit 5 shows the features that have become s andard in the BMW 5 Series from 
1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2004. 
 
 Exhibit 5: BMW 5 Series options that have become standard 1994 and 1999 
 
1994 Extras standard in 1999                    1999 Extras standard in 2004 
Passenger airbag                              Dynamic Stability Control  
Electric windows                              Velour floormats 
Aircon                                         Fog headlights 
Trip computer                                 Cruise control 
Business RDS Radio                            Automatic Climate Con rol 
Traction control                                6.5in monitor 
ABS                                           16in Alloys 
                                               6 Speed Manual 
 
 
    BMW ’s product strategy is to be present at the premium end of all significant 
market segments. The MINI was BMW’s first attempt to target the premium part of the 
small-segment car market. In particular, the company felt that there was a market for 
a premium vehicle with the ride and handling characteristics of larger BMW vehicles, 
but with smaller physical dimensions. The MINI was launched in 2001 and continues to 
perform well, with over 184,000 units sold in 2004. The MINI is hardly a better drive 
than a Ford Focus or a VolkswagenGolf, but it consistently wins hearts and wallets 
through its sheer brand character expressed by its design and style. Lik  the Beetl , 
the original MINI became a fashion accessory for people who could aff d t  buy a ot 
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more car. Given the success of the MINI, BMW decided to introduce the 1 Series which 
will compete against the Audi A3, Alfa Romeo 147, and high-end VW Golf derivatives. 
 
     In the ultra luxury segment, BMW launched the new Rolls-Royce Phan om in 
2003. The Phantom is assembled in a new Rolls-Royce factory in Goodwood UK, but 
most of the components are sourced from BMW in Germany. At the price of 371,200 
Euro, almost no car is priced close to the Rolls-Royce Phantom and order book
remains full, with 792 units sold in 2004.  
 
     The Rolls-Royce and MINI additions lie at the heart of BMW’s premium brand 
strategy. According to Panke, “ We have two brands now that are uniquely suited to 
BMW ’s way of doing business. We have a brand in Rolls-Royce that uniquely defines 
luxury the world over to which we bring our resources, expertise and processes to put 
it back on the pedestal intact where it belongs. In MINI, we have a brand that is and
will continue to be the undisputed premium choice in the small car market---that s a 
totally unique positioning that no other brand in the world will be able to claim. So, in 
these two brands, we have characteristics and imagery that no other ompany c n 
claim or copy. That, to me, is the essence of brand value and brand management.” 
 
 
 
5. Human Resource Management 
 
The BMW Group had a workforce of 105,972 employees at the end of 2004. To 
create a framework of values and act as a guide to the behavior of employe s, the 
following guidelines were established for the personnel and social policy of the BMW 
Group. 
1. Working together is characterized by mutual respect and a positive culture 
of conflict 
2. Thinking beyond national and cultural boundaries is an intrinsic quality 
3. The performance of and results achieved by our employees are the 
yardstick for remuneration by the company 
4. Team performance is more than the sum of individual contributions 
5. Secure and attractive jobs are offered for committed and responsible 
employees 
6. Respect of human rights is a given 
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7. Social standards for suppliers and business partners are the basis for 
doing business 
8. The BMW Group stands for outstanding benefits for employees and a 
strong commitment to society 
 
 
On the basis of these guidelines, the human resource management---in clos  
collaboration with the managers and the various employee represen ati e b dies---
creates the conditions and climates that will allow the employee and managers to 
further develop their willingness to learn, creativity, initiative and commitment.  
 
BMW developed the Associate Model titled “We at BMW” to encourage 
associates to take on personal responsibility and foster teamwork and a culture of 
trust. The model represents a vision that BMW has set itself for the future and serves 
as the basis for the personnel system in the day-to-day working nvironment. The 
following six principles applies to all associates, independent of task and hierarchy: 
 
1. Obtain best results due to sustained high performance 
2. Accept responsibility for his or her personal contribution to the succe s of 
the company 
3. Follow and be involved 
4. Work together in different work and o ganizational structures 
5. Perceive change as an opportunity, and not as a threat 
6. Demonstrate flexibility and continuously further develop oneself 
 
     A leadership model was developed as an addition to the associate model t  
specify a uniform understanding of management at BMW. Leaving behind 
“hierarchically-oriented thinking”, the leadership model emphasizes high-quality 
teamwork in changing, flexible structur s by means of both specialist leadership and 
personal leadership. The ten principles of the Leadership Model are as follows: 
 
1. Management is a personal achievement, the adoption of risks, and not just 
the application of directives, regulations and systems  
2. Managers develop “r alistic” visions and can fill others with enthusiasm for 
them 
3. Managers set an example and obtain recognition by means of their integrity 
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and credibility. They set high standards and allow themselves to be 
measured against these standards 
4. Managers place the task in the foreground and not themselves 
5. Managers develop objectives, provide for specific agreements on objectives 
and create space for their associates to act on their own initiativ . 
6. Managers have good communication skills and create durable working
relationships 
7. Managers create an environment--despite orientation on costs and results—
that conveys the fun of work to the associates 
8. Managers lead by trust. They provide security and backing, but al o d aw 
consequences if necessary. They accept responsibility and do not make 
excuses 
9. Managers develop efficient teams. They challenge and foster so that both 
strong and weak associates are led to maximum achievement in the te m. 
Good managers foster in particular those associates that could “overtake” 
them. 
10. Managers are able to act successfully in different cultural environme ts and 
to lead multicultural teams.  
 
     BMW regularly ranks among the most popular employers in Germany. The 
company invested 232 million euro(3.2% of total personnel expenditure) in prime a d 
further training for its employees to prepare th m for future challenges and ensuring 
that they have the right skills. BMW offers more than three hundred flexible work time 
arrangements which extends from flexitime and part-time models to rolling multiple-
shift systems and market-oriented working time. Through the use f flexibl  working 
hours, BMW is able to organize work more fficiently and provide employees with a 
greater sense of freedom and responsibility. Apart from the “thrilling product”, 
employees at BMW are motivated in particular, in their own words, by ongoing 
personal and professional challenges, by the opportunity to shape the future and he 
high standard of freedom and flexibility the company has to offer. 
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